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We present a model of how institutional pressures at the community level shape
corporate social action—behaviors and practices that extend beyond immediate profit
maximization goals and are intended to increase social benefits or mitigate social
problems for constituencies external to the firm—within the metropolitan area where
firms are headquartered. We propose that community isomorphism influences the
nature and level of corporate social action within communities and conclude with
theoretical implications emphasizing the community as the focal unit of analysis for
understanding corporate social action.
Why do corporations engage in social action?
The reason perhaps most often cited is that cor-
porate social performance is good for financial
performance, the rationale being that social
spending is “akin to advertising” (Burt, 1983: 419;
Webb & Farmer, 1996). This rationale reflects the
belief that a corporation that cultivates a more
positive and distinctive reputation will attract
consumers (Creyer & Ross, 1997; Ellen, Mohr, &
Webb, 2000; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001) and po-
tential employees (Turban & Greening, 1997),
thereby boosting profitability. But Margolis and
Walsh (2003) concluded from their exhaustive
analysis of 127 studies conducted over the last
thirty years that the connection between social
and financial performance is mixed and often
contradictory. For example, Burt (1983) demon-
strated a positive relationship between firms’
focus on individual consumers and charitable
giving, but Galaskiewicz (1997) found no rela-
tionship between these two items. The wide-
spread disagreement and conflicting findings in
this literature suggest that economic explana-
tions cannot account for either the frequency or
nature of corporate social action. Doubts about
the financial merits of corporate social action
thus lend greater urgency to our opening ques-
tion: Given the uncertainty of financial benefits,
why do firms engage at all in social practices?
The noneconomic motives for corporate social
action have been explored from a number of
perspectives. From a normative perspective, cor-
porate social action has variously been charac-
terized as a well-intended effort to promote “jus-
tice in a world in which . . . the shareholder
wealth maximization paradigm reigns” (Margo-
lis & Walsh, 2003: 273) and an attempt to con-
vince “disbelievers” (Weiser & Zadek, 2000) of
the value and need for corporate social involve-
ment. Corporate accounts often portray social
action as an expression of an individual organi-
zation’s distinctive identity, image, or mission
(Bartel, 2001) or that of its visionary founder or
CEO (Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman 1998). Corpo-
rate social action might also be a response to
social movement actors that direct a corpora-
tion’s (or industry’s) attention to social needs,
such as environmentalism, global citizenship,
or urban problems (e.g., Bornstein, 2004;
Lounsbury, 2001; Rao, 1998). Finally, social prac-
tices motivated for cultural, institutional, and
political reasons might serve a corporation’s ef-
forts to secure legitimacy or competitive differ-
entiation (e.g., Bansal & Roth, 2000; Himmelstein,
1997; Hoffman, 1999).
Although it has been influential, this growing
stream of research tends to be atomistic, focus-
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ing on accounting for social action at the level of
the individual organization. However much
might be said for these explanations, they fall
short of explaining broader and well-docu-
mented patterns of corporate engagement. Ga-
laskiewicz’s numerous and influential studies
(1985, 1991, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Ga-
laskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989) of the Minneap-
olis-St. Paul philanthropic community demon-
strate the high interdependence between
corporations and local nonprofits that target so-
cial needs. Others (e.g., Besser, 1998; Guthrie,
2003; McElroy & Siegfried, 1986) have illumi-
nated community-based patterns of social ac-
tion and have shown such action to be deeply
rooted in the communities where firms (or their
headquarters) are located. But theoretical
frameworks for explaining this community-
based nature of corporate social action have yet
to emerge. Our purpose here is to respond to
calls for broader explanations of corporate so-
cial practices (Margolis & Walsh, 2003) by theo-
rizing about how communities influence corpo-
rate social action.
We view corporate social action through an
institutional lens. Institutional theory affords in-
sights into corporate social action that extend
beyond the interests of individual firms, through
the establishment of community-based patterns.
Conceptualizing the local geographic commu-
nity in which a firm is located as a source of
institutional pressures that give rise to and
structure the nature and level of corporate social
action enables us to account for patterns of cor-
porate giving observed in such metropolitan ar-
eas as Minneapolis-St. Paul, Atlanta, Cleveland,
and Seattle (e.g., Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1991, 1997;
Guthrie, 2003), as well as variations in corporate
behaviors across communities (e.g., Abzug & Si-
monoff, 2004; Bielefeld & Corbin, 1996). We at-
tempt to explain such variation by applying the
central tenet of institutional theory—that iso-
morphism legitimates—to community infra-
structures. We theorize that patterns of confor-
mity in corporate social action emerge within
local geographic communities. We propose that
the nature and level of corporate social action
are driven by community isomorphism, which
we define as the resemblance of a focal corpo-
ration’s social practices to those of other corpo-
rations within its geographic community. We
believe corporations to be especially vulnerable
to institutionalized pressures at the community
level because the legitimacy of such practices is
often questioned (e.g., Friedman, 1970), and cor-
porations frequently turn to local “peers” to
sanction activities whose legitimacy is uncer-
tain (Davis & Greve, 1997).
We develop a conceptual framework for cor-
porate social action that models the influence of
the local community. The central idea is that
standards of appropriateness regarding the na-
ture and level of corporate social action are em-
bedded within local communities, and organiza-
tional conformity to these institutionalized
practices yields systemic patterns that vary by
community. Our model is informed by informa-
tion from relevant literature, press accounts,
and published research on corporate and non-
profit activities, such as that of KLD Research &
Analytics Inc., a supplier of corporate social rat-
ings, and the Urban Institute’s compilation of
nonprofit reporting data. To get a better sense of
what corporate social action entails and how it
is influenced by communities, we also con-
ducted informational interviews with approxi-
mately fifty individuals in two major metropoli-
tan areas.
We begin by defining our major constructs,
and we then present our conceptual model and
associated propositions regarding how institu-
tional aspects of community shape the nature
and level of corporate social action. We con-
clude with thoughts on the implications of our
model for theory and research.
CORPORATE SOCIAL ACTION AND LOCAL
COMMUNITY
We define corporate social action as behav-
iors and practices that extend beyond immedi-
ate profit maximization goals and are intended
to increase social benefits or mitigate social
problems for constituencies external to the firm.
Corporate social action can focus on any num-
ber of diverse social needs or issues, including,
but not limited to, the arts, housing, the physical
environment, education and schooling, human
welfare, poverty, disease, wellness, and general
improvement in the quality of life. Corporate
activities that address such social concerns can
take a variety of forms, including cash contribu-
tions, investments in social initiatives or pro-
grams, employee volunteer efforts, and in-kind
donations of products or services, and they can
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represent varying levels of monetary and time
commitment.
We use “corporate social action” rather than
“corporate social responsibility” because we do
not take up the argument that corporations have
a “responsibility” to engage in social behavior.
We seek simply to generate a theoretical per-
spective on the category of corporate practices
oriented toward delivering social benefits out-
side the firm. We nevertheless recognize that
corporate social action often is cast as corporate
social responsibility. Note, for example, the sim-
ilarity between our conceptualization and an
early definition of corporate social responsibil-
ity advanced by Davis: “firms’ consideration of,
and response to, issues beyond the narrow eco-
nomic, technical, and legal requirements of the
firm . . . [to] accomplish social benefits along
with the traditional economic gains which the
firm seeks” (1973: 312–313). We rely on the inten-
tions of the actors to illuminate what might be a
“social benefit,” recognizing that there might not
be consensus about the benefits of corporate
actions (e.g., Friedman, 1970). Our focus, thus, is
on the well-intentioned social actions of corpo-
rations, not on their responsibility to engage in
these actions.
For operational purposes we define a firm’s
local community as the metropolitan statistical
area (MSA) in which its headquarters is located.
MSAs are a unit of analysis consistent with the
extant literature (e.g., Marquis, 2003; Stuart &
Sorenson, 2003) and include an inner city and
adjacent communities that have a high degree
of economic and social integration with that
city. On the basis of prior work, we assume a
relatively high degree of interdependence
among local community actors, such as the gen-
eral public, nonprofits, government agencies,
and corporations with a significant presence in
the locale.
We propose that local geographic environ-
ments—that is, communities—are especially
important influences on corporate social action
for two reasons. The first is that local under-
standings, norms, and rules can serve as touch-
stones for legitimizing corporate social action.
Previous research suggests that local and im-
mediate institutional environments might be
more salient than broader ones when a practice
is contentious (Davis & Greve, 1997), as is often
the case with corporate social action (Friedman,
1970; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). For example,
Davis and Greve (1997) have documented that
when corporate boards adopt a golden para-
chute (a controversial practice that richly re-
wards executives who lose their jobs following a
takeover), they look to the actions of other lo-
cally headquartered companies for standards of
appropriateness. The result tends to be signifi-
cant homogeneity within communities but sub-
stantial variation between communities. In
some cities (such as Dallas) most firms quickly
adopted a golden parachute; in others (such as
San Jose) most or all local companies rejected it.
Guthrie’s (2003) study of corporate giving in
Cleveland, Atlanta, and Seattle, which supports
this pattern, speaks to the emergence of locally
defined norms of appropriateness concerning
corporate social action. Differences between lo-
cal cultures frequently emerged in his 150 inter-
views across these three metropolitan areas.
Useem suggests that community-based norms
and attitudes regarding philanthropy are “per-
haps the most significant factor shaping a com-
pany’s giving” (1988: 83).
A second reason local communities might be
influential is more pragmatic: corporate social
actions are commonly oriented toward the lo-
cales in which a corporation’s executives reside.
Galaskiewicz (1997) found that approximately 70
percent of the corporate philanthropy of Minne-
apolis-St. Paul headquartered firms stayed
within that metropolitan area, and McElroy and
Siegfried (1986) reported similar numbers from
their study of 229 companies across 14 U.S. cit-
ies. The observation of one civic leader we in-
terviewed—that “80 percent of corporate spend-
ing is typically in the headquarters city”—is
corroborated by Guthrie’s (2003) study of 2,776
firms’ giving behavior in 2001 and 2002. Guthrie
reported that 77 percent of giving across fifty
communities stayed within the community and
that 80 percent of corporations claimed that their
largest single donation had been within their
community. Further support for this headquar-
ters-based pattern of social action is provided
by a study in Miami, Boston, and Cleveland that
showed that locally headquartered companies
contributed to their communities considerably
more than nonlocal companies and were much
more involved in civic leadership at the local
level (Kanter, 1997).
Our focus on how corporate social action is
shaped by institutional pressures at the level of
the local community builds on this work. Be-
2007 927Marquis, Glynn, and Davis
cause we emphasize this perspective, other as-
pects of community remain outside our model,
including economic conditions and firm-level
factors, which may also play a role. Previous
studies, for example, have found philanthropy to
vary significantly with corporate size and indus-
try (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Guthrie, 2003; Wolpert,
1993). Banks and utilities rank near the top on
indices of corporate social responsibility; man-
ufacturers and service firms have characteristi-
cally different patterns of giving (Kirchberg,
1995; Useem, 1988). Also important are local so-
cioeconomic contexts, including local income
levels (Wolpert, 1993) and educational attain-
ment (Kirchberg, 1995). We believe that these
factors might function as boundary conditions
for community-level institutional effects. We
discuss how they might interact with our focal
model in the concluding section.
Using an institutional lens, we conceptualize
communities as constituting organizations’ im-
mediate environment, and, thus, they can be
modeled in terms of three basic aspects of insti-
tutions (Scott, 2001): (1) cultural cognitive, which
is the shared framework of interpretation; (2)
normative, which defines standards of appropri-
ateness and evaluation; and (3) regulative,
which imposes formal and informal constraints
on action. The local geographic community, as
an immediate institutional environment, thus
serves both as a touchstone for legitimacy and
as a target for corporate social change, shaping
both the nature and level of corporate social
action. We elaborate these dual aspects of cor-
porate social action and then expand on the
institutional forces that characterize communi-
ties.
The Nature of Corporate Social Action: Focus
and Form
We define the nature of corporate social ac-
tion in terms of two elements: its focus, which
describes the domain that is targeted (e.g., pro-
moting the arts, supporting education, or devel-
oping housing), and its form, which describes
the manner in which the company engages with
that domain (e.g., cash donations, volunteerism,
or provision of products or services).
Focus of corporate social action. By focus we
mean the particular set of social problems or
needs corporate activities are intended to miti-
gate or benefit. To parse the focus of corporate
action, we synthesized the classification sys-
tems for types of corporate philanthropy and
nonprofit organizations already in use by the
Taft Group (2005), Foundation Center (2004), and
Urban Institute (2004). We took the remarkably
similar category systems used by these diverse
groups as an indicator of general agreement
about the social domains on which corporations
focus their efforts. We found these to cluster into
four major focus categories: (1) arts and culture,
(2) civic and public benefit, (3) education, and (4)
health and human welfare. Types of organiza-
tions within each of these four major categories
are, for example, (1) museums and performing
arts groups; (2) community infrastructure–
oriented programs focused, for instance, on eco-
nomic development, housing, public safety, and
local environmental efforts; (3) local colleges, as
well as national universities and other schools;
and (4) medical research, mental health, and
food and nutrition programs.
We chose to use broad focal categories in or-
der to discern the general structure of the types
of social actions companies can engage in. In
practice, corporate actions may sometimes cut
across these categories, such as programs that
provide health programs in schools or that spon-
sor cultural events at public housing sites. The
targets of corporate activities focused on these
domains of social issues can be as broad and
diverse as the general public or people in need
or as specific as children, the elderly, the dis-
abled, or military veterans, as well as other
stakeholders in the community. Corporate social
action focused on health and human services,
for example, could primarily benefit children
with cancer or could broadly serve an entire
community, as through the construction of a new
hospital wing.
Our argument that corporate social action
within communities has a definitive focus is
supported by studies that report significant dif-
ferences across cities in how and where corpo-
rate giving is focused (Guthrie, 2003; Guthrie &
McQuarrie, 2005); low income housing, for exam-
ple, characterized corporate giving in Cleveland
and Atlanta but not in Seattle. Cleveland and
Columbus, Ohio, are also illustrative of cities
with very different patterns of corporate philan-
thropy. From company profiles in KLD’s Socrates
database, we extracted and classified, using the
four-category system outlined above, the main
foci of the corporate social actions of the seven
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major firms in each community. These are sum-
marized by city in Table 1 (Columbus, Ohio) and
Table 2 (Cleveland, Ohio). We present these ex-
amples as illustrations of the different types of
social action in which corporations engage.
From the tables we observe that major cor-
porations in each city target to some extent all
four of the focal categories (arts/culture, civic/
public benefit, education, health/human wel-
fare), but patterns of social action across the
two communities exhibit fine-grained differ-
ences. In Columbus all but one of the seven
major corporations focus on civic and public
benefit, and half of these corporate programs
target children’s needs (e.g., The Children’s
Defense Fund). Most of the corporations also
focus on education and health/human welfare,
but children are singled out for particular at-
tention, ranging from kindergarten tutoring to
pediatric AIDS. We can speculate that the
Columbus corporations’ focus on the civic, ed-
ucational, and health-related needs of chil-
dren might stem from the influence of Wendy’s
founder, Dave Thomas, a dedicated financial
supporter of as well as outspoken advocate
for children. Other Columbus headquartered
TABLE 1
The Nature of Corporate Social Action by Community: Illustrations of Focus and Form for the
Seven Major Corporations in Columbus, Ohioa
Focus
Company Arts and Culture
Civic and Public
Benefit Education
Health and Human
Welfare
American Electric
Power
Donates $100 to
organizations where
employees volunteer
Bob Evans United Negro College
Fund
Children’s Hospitals
4-H, Boy & Girl
Scouts, Children’s
Defense
Fund
In-kind donations to
Second Harvest
Food Banks
Cardinal Health Grants to support
employee volunteer
efforts
Two major grants of
$100,000 each for
leaders in children’s
health care
Huntington
Bancshares
20 percent of FY 2002
donations
20 percent of FY 2002
donations
25 percent of FY 2002
donations
35 percent of FY 2002
donations
Targets loans at low-
to moderate-income
areas
The Limited Children’s Defense
Fund
Adoption of classes or
schools
Pediatric AIDS
Action for Children
Columbus Foundation
“Reads Program”
tutoring for
kindergarten
Ohio Hunger Task
Force
Wendy’s
International
Dave Thomas
Foundation for
Adoption
Scholarships to
students for college
Tim Horton Children’s
Foundation
Worthington
Industries
Community Shelter
Board
for homeless men
YMCA Future of
America award for
children’s
leadership skills
a All Columbus headquartered firms that were on the S&P 500 Index or Domini 400 Social Index as of 2000.
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companies as diverse as The Limited, Bob
Evans, and Cardinal Health evidence similar
attention to children. The Limited, in addi-
tion to supporting many child-oriented causes,
including The Children’s Defense Fund, Ac-
tion for Children, and Pediatric AIDS, also has
an employee volunteer program of kindergar-
ten tutoring—employees contributing about
100,000 hours to 1,400 schools in 2003. Bob
Evans supports the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts,
Children’s Hospitals, and Children’s Defense
Fund, and Cardinal Health made two major
grants, each in the amount of $100,000, to
recognize leaders in children’s health
care. Thus, we see in Columbus a thematic
focus on corporate initiatives in civic, educa-
tional, and health concerns related to chil-
dren’s needs.
TABLE 2
The Nature of Corporate Social Action by Community: Illustrations of Focus and Form for the Nine
Major Corporations in Cleveland, Ohioa
Focus
Company Arts and Culture
Civic and Public
Benefit Education
Health and Human
Welfare
American Greetings
Corporation
Scholarships
Charter One
Financial
Coalition for
Homelessness
Renovations to school
Affordable housing
Eaton Corporation Award for employee
volunteers (since
1933)
Science Education,
Junior Achievement
Habitat for Humanity
Supports affordable
housing
Key Corp Paid volunteer time United Negro College
FundEnterprise
Foundation for
affordable housing
Scholarship Program
Best minority loan
provider in
northern Ohio
National City 12 percent of Paid volunteer time
Corporation donations Better than peers on
low-income loans
Nordson Corporation “Talent and Time”
volunteer program
Habitat for Humanity
43 percent to
education
Teacher development
programs
Parker-Hannifin
Corporation
United Negro College
Fund
HBCU engineering
focus
Progressive
Corporation
Maintains substantial
contemporary art
collection
Works to reduce cost
and trauma of auto
accidents
Sherwin-Williams
Company
In-kind donations for
neighborhood
cleanup
a All Cleveland headquartered firms that were on the S&P 500 Index or Domini 400 Social Index as of 2000, with the
exception of TRW, which subsequently became a private company.
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In Cleveland the focus of corporate social action
is more concentrated on affordable housing pro-
grams but more diverse in the constituencies
served, embracing the homeless, minority home
owners, and low-income families. The efforts of
local financial services firms Key Corp and Na-
tional City Corporation have drawn praise, and
Habitat for Humanity finds strong supporters in
manufacturers Eaton and Nordson. Perhaps
Cleveland’s focus on housing is explained by
Guthrie and McQuarrie’s (2005) finding that pas-
sage of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
seemed to generate corporate incentives to focus
social action in this arena, which suggests that
the nature of the regulative institutional environ-
ment might influence the focus of corporate social
action.
Form of corporate social action. We further
propose that there are systematic variations in
the form corporate social action takes. We cate-
gorize the form of corporate social action accord-
ing to the typology developed by the Committee
on Corporate Grant Making (Council on Foun-
dations, 2002): (1) cash, (2) volunteerism, (3) in-
kind donations, and (4) noncommercial sponsor-
ship. The differences among these categories at
the local level are echoed in Guthrie’s (2003)
description of how different cities are character-
ized by different forms of social spending. In
Cleveland the dominant form is cash donations
and in Seattle and Atlanta, in-kind donations.
Tables 1 and 2 vividly illustrate how local com-
panies can coalesce around an appropriate form
of giving. In addition to Guthrie’s (2003) finding on
social spending, Cleveland companies, for exam-
ple, support considerable employee volunteerism
(see Table 2); Eaton has given awards to employee
volunteers since 1933, and Nordson, as a supple-
ment to offering paid time off for volunteering,
inaugurated its “Talent and Time” program,
which matches employee interests and talents
with community needs. In Columbus (see Table 1)
no particular form of giving is dominant, perhaps
as a result of the strong thematic focus on chil-
dren’s issues in different social domains, which
can, and does, take a variety of forms.
Level of Corporate Social Action
Level refers to the amount—of money, time, or
other quantity—a company expends on social ac-
tivities. Financial giving is an obvious measure;
clearly, the level of corporate social action can be
assessed in terms of total dollars contributed to a
social cause or the valuation (dollar amount) of
in-kind donations. But level can also be quantified
in nonfinancial terms, such as the number of ex-
ecutives that serve the nonprofit community or the
number of corporate volunteer hours.
Galaskiewicz’s work (1985, 1991, 1997) demon-
strating the high levels of corporate giving for
Minneapolis-St. Paul is perhaps the best exam-
ple of how a community can influence a corpo-
ration’s level of engagement. But not all commu-
nities are like Minneapolis. Press accounts
routinely lament the lack of philanthropy in Sil-
icon Valley, even calling residents of this mil-
lionaire-rich community the “cyber-stingy” (El-
kind, 2000). Thus, levels of corporate social
action can vary substantially across communi-
ties.
To further illustrate we offer some examples
from the 2000 KLD corporate social responsibil-
ity database (see Waddock & Graves, 1994, for a
description of KLD’s methods and data). KLD
rates 662 publicly traded firms, including mem-
bers of the S&P 500 and Domini 400 indices.
Firms are awarded points for surpassing thresh-
old levels on each of six dimensions: generous
charitable giving (more than 1.5 percent of net
earnings before taxes), innovative giving, sup-
port for housing (through partnerships that
support housing for the economically disadvan-
taged), support for education, non-U.S. charita-
ble giving, and other strengths (e.g., volunteer
programs or in-kind giving).
To identify community variations in levels of
giving, we averaged KLD ratings across these
six dimensions for the thirty-six MSAs that
host more than four company headquarters.
We found the average score across the top ten
MSAs to be nine times greater than the aver-
age of the bottom ten MSAs. Not surprisingly,
Minneapolis was number one, followed by
Charlotte-Gastonia, North Carolina; Balti-
more, Maryland; San Francisco, California;
and New York City. The bottom dwellers in-
cluded Bergen-Passaic, New Jersey; Birming-
ham, Alabama; Columbus, Ohio; and Orange
County and Santa Cruz, California. All had
scores of zero, indicating no significant level
of contribution from any company headquar-
tered in any of these MSAs. San Jose (the MSA
for Silicon Valley), consistent with its image as
an impoverished region for philanthropy,
ranked twenty-eight out of the thirty-six com-
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munities. These examples illustrate diverse
levels of corporate social action across com-
munities. The important question becomes
how to explain this variation.
A MODEL OF HOW COMMUNITIES AFFECT
CORPORATE SOCIAL ACTION
The foundation of our approach, in neoinstitu-
tional theory, draws on Scott’s influential work
to model how geographic communities influ-
ence the social action of organizations. Institu-
tions are properties of a collective such as a
geographic community or organizational field.
Our arguments thus describe how institutional
features of communities shape the actions of
decision makers embedded in those communi-
ties—in particular, the corporate executives in a
position to steer corporate social action. Figure 1
summarizes our argument, which theorizes the
mechanisms (Davis & Marquis, 2005) by which
cultural cognitive, social normative, and regula-
tive forces in communities generate patterns in
the nature and level of corporate social action.
We expand on each of the institutional factors
by advancing propositions that describe how
features of communities affect corporate social
engagement.
Cultural Cognitive Community Forces
Cultural cognitive institutional forces arise
from the shared frameworks or mental models
actors draw from to create common definitions
of a situation. Within a given frame of reference,
sensible courses of action often follow a shared
set of underlying logics that arise from these
cognitive templates as shaped by cultural influ-
ences (Scott, 2001). Our focus here is on how
corporate communities come to share a frame of
reference around the nature of corporate social
action. These frames of reference are a source of
templates or models characteristic of a set of
actors that facilitate the adoption of similar
practices by other members of the group.
FIGURE 1
Model of Corporate Social Action at the Community Level
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The importance of geographic communities
for understanding organizational behavior was
documented in early institutional work, such as
Selznick’s (1949) study of the Tennessee Valley
Authority and Zald’s (1970) research on the Chi-
cago YMCA, both of which testify to the strong
influence of local environments on organiza-
tions. More recent work illuminates the influ-
ence of locally shared frames of reference on a
variety of organizational behaviors, ranging
from patterns of philanthropy (Galaskiewicz,
1997) to styles of doing business in high-tech
industrial districts (Saxenian, 1994). Molotch,
Freudenberg, and Paulsen (2000), contrasting
the divergent trajectories of Santa Barbara, Cal-
ifornia and Ventura, California, argue that dif-
ferent “city traditions” perpetuated by commu-
nity organizations shaped patterns and levels of
economic development in these two communi-
ties. Analyzing how different community-level
frames of corporate governance influence
boards of director networks in fifty-one U.S. cit-
ies, Marquis (2003) found that prominent local
firms serve as templates for appropriate board
behavior for community newcomers. Finally,
Lounsbury (2007) shows how different institu-
tional logics fundamentally shaped variation in
the practices and behavior of geographically
distinct groups of actors; mutual funds in Bos-
ton, for example, resisted the efforts of New York
funds to push aggressive growth money man-
agement strategies by maintaining a focus on
conservative, long-term investing.
Robert Putnam’s (2000) work on social capital
in the United States includes an analysis of the
distinct patterns of social engagement among
the American states. His “social capital index”
highlights individual differences in propensity
to volunteer, inviting others over to dinner, and
similar actions that express, in general ways,
the social engagement of community members.
By extension, different standards of appropriate-
ness in different localities might reasonably be
expected to differentially affect corporate social
action in the community, inasmuch as key or-
ganizational constituents such as senior man-
agers and employees also populate the local
environment and the local community consti-
tutes an important group of stakeholders (Free-
man, 1994).
Taken together, these studies suggest that
cognitive templates about what constitutes ap-
propriate, credible, or legitimate organizational
social practices differ across localities, and the
degree of isomorphism or community consensus
about the nature of appropriate corporate social
practices will pressure corporations to align
their activities in ways that are sanctioned by
the community. Moreover, common and ac-
cepted ways of acting serve as models that can
be used by existing or new actors within a com-
munity as reference points for patterning their
actions.
We contrast the MSAs of Minneapolis-St. Paul
and Atlanta to illustrate how community-based
templates drive the nature of corporate social
action within locales. Minneapolis’s vibrant
civic sector and generous level of philanthropic
giving have been lauded by Galaskiewicz and
others. Less well known is that a primary focus
of giving is arts and cultural activities and that
this reflects the institutionalized sentiments of
the community. That Minneapolis-St. Paul resi-
dents highly value the arts was manifestly evi-
dent in the 2003 Minnesota State Survey; when
asked, “Do you believe that arts and cultural
activities help to make Minnesota an attractive
place to live and work?” more than 94 percent of
respondents answered in the affirmative (Min-
nesota Citizens for the Arts, 2004). A local news-
paper cited figures showing higher per capita
theater going among residents of the Twin Cit-
ies (82 percent) than among residents of compa-
rable cities, such as Chicago (45 percent), St.
Louis (24 percent), and Boston (18 percent; Min-
neapolis Star Tribune, 2001). According to the
Urban Institute’s (2000) data on nonprofit giving,
Minneapolis-St. Paul is among the top five cities
in per capita giving to the arts (much of which
comes from business) but ranks thirtieth overall
for non-arts–related nonprofits. Government of-
ficials support this pattern, as evidenced by the
following sentiment expressed by former gover-
nor Elmer L. Anderson: “Except for its educa-
tional opportunities, nothing strikes me as more
important to Minnesota’s quality of life than its
art programs. Theater, music, dance, visual arts
are all important parts of a good society” (Min-
nesota Citizens for the Arts, 2004).
The pattern observed for Atlanta is markedly
different. Atlanta businesses contribute a mere
$8 per capita to the arts, compared to $63 for
Minneapolis. Corporate social action in Atlanta
is oriented toward local boosterism. The “At-
lanta spirit,” which emphasizes image building
through visible public works, receives extensive
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comment in academic literature and the press.
In a book on Olympic cities, Burbank, Andrano-
vich, and Heying describe boosterism as a “per-
vasive ethos of the city’s business elites” that
influenced Atlanta corporations’ intense focus
on the Olympic games (2001: 82). An article in the
local Atlanta Journal-Constitution observes that
“even a hundred years ago, Atlanta was the city
of big horn-tooters” and that the same pride in
promoting the city that led to hosting the 1996
Olympics had led, in 1895, to Atlanta’s being
chosen as the venue for the Cotton States Expo-
sition (Chambers, 1998: 1). Historian Bradley
Rice, author of Georgia: Empire State of the
South, notes a continuing “tradition of Atlanta
boosterism” (quoted in Holley, 1995: 5), which
might nowhere be better evidenced than in its’
hosting the 1996 Olympic games. In Atlanta the
focus of corporate social action tends to center
on community events that afford civic and pub-
lic benefit, as well as on the development of an
infrastructure that showcases the city. Comple-
menting this focus is an equally clear form of
corporate social action, documented by Guthrie
(2003) as in-kind donations.
The examples of Minneapolis-St. Paul and At-
lanta might seem like extreme cases, but such
an alignment between community ideology and
the nature of corporate social action parallels
that found in industry-level analyses. For exam-
ple, local electric utility representatives de-
scribed to us how their philanthropy typically
focused on technology education—and bankers
how theirs focused on housing. Examples of cor-
porate giving driven by community focus can be
found in other cities as well. Seattle’s legacy of
music innovation aligns well with its new arts
institution, Experience Music Project Museum;
corporations in the entertainment center of Los
Angeles recently funded a new $300 million con-
cert hall; and companies in San Francisco, re-
nowned as a technology center, scored the high-
est on the innovative giving index of KLD. Albeit
anecdotal, these examples suggest that differ-
ent communities’ different styles of giving are
reflected in the nature of corporate social action.
The preceding examples speak to the influ-
ence on corporate social action of shared cogni-
tive typifications at the community level. Such
typifications are governed by constitutive rules
that define institutional fields of meaning, as
well as the actors’ capacity for action within
those fields. The degree of isomorphism, or prev-
alence of a particular form, focus, or level of
corporate social action, is an index of consensus
about such cognitive boundaries (Glynn & Ab-
zug, 2002). As Zucker found, the “greater the de-
gree of institutionalization, the greater the . . .
uniformity of cultural understandings, the
greater the maintenance . . . and the greater the
resistance to change” (1991: 103). The degree of
isomorphism or community consensus about the
nature of corporate social action, in terms of
both focus and form, shapes corporations’ prac-
tices. These shared ways of acting serve as tem-
plates that can be easily adopted by existing
organizations in, or organizations new to, a com-
munity. That corporations, in their quest for le-
gitimacy, generally align their practices with
those sanctioned by the community leads us to
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Community-level cul-
tural cognitive factors will affect the
nature of corporate social action,
shaping both its focus and form, lead-
ing to isomorphism within communi-
ties.
Social Normative Community Factors
The social and normative systems that de-
velop in cities set the standards for and enforce
conformity to accepted levels of giving. For ex-
ample, Guthrie (2003) found that 91 percent of
companies reported strong to moderate local
norms for philanthropic activities. Following
this logic, we propose that social and normative
systems have a strong effect on the level of
social action. We believe this distinction to be
important and to stem from the fact that the
level of corporate giving is closely tied to an-
nual profits (Kirchberg, 1995; McElroy & Sieg-
fried, 1986). Consequently, corporations must
consciously revisit and manage the level of their
corporate social activity each year, making it
likely that normative systems and standards in
place in each community have a large influence
on these decisions.
Normative influences are distinct from cul-
tural cognitive influences in having an underly-
ing evaluative tone. Whereas the cultural cog-
nitive gives a shared frame of reference, of “how
things are done around here,” the normative
arises from a moral base—“what is right to do
around here.” Normative influences shape exec-
934 JulyAcademy of Management Review
utives’ evaluations of their peers and, con-
versely, influence how their peers’ evaluative
expectations shape the executives’ choices of
social actions. This evaluative nature becomes
more salient when we take into account the an-
nual revisiting of levels of corporate social ac-
tion. Those in dense social systems that value
high levels of giving, such as business execu-
tives in the tight-knit community of Minneapolis,
face regular scrutiny from their colleagues,
which can enforce norms around appropriate
levels of contribution.
Galaskiewicz (1985, 1991, 1997) has docu-
mented the institutionalization of these dynam-
ics in Minneapolis’s “Ethic of Enlightened Self-
Interest,” which includes the famous “5-Percent
Club” established in the 1970s, whose members
pledge to give 5 percent of after-tax profits to
charity. The club’s more than 250 member com-
panies today donate either 2 percent or 5 percent
of their profits to the community. Galaskiewicz
describes how early business leaders tried to
create a pattern of social influence that would
enhance local companies’ corporate service
largely by creating a social infrastructure that
connected local companies and nonprofits,
which helped to enforce the normative level of
corporate giving.
Previous studies of the geographic basis of
corporate behavior have documented how nor-
mative factors vary by city (e.g., Kono, Palmer,
Friedland, & Zafonte, 1998; Lounsbury, 2007; Mar-
quis, 2003). Earlier investigators also docu-
mented how institutions and linkages devel-
oped among diverse organizations located
within the same community (e.g., Lincoln, 1979;
Litwack & Hylton, 1962; Turk, 1977; Warren, 1967).
Interestingly, much of this early work sought to
demonstrate that the American community was
undergoing great change that involved the in-
creasing orientation of local community units
toward extracommunity relations. But more re-
cent investigations such as those by Ga-
laskiewicz (1997) and Marquis (2003, Marquis &
Lounsbury, in press) illustrate that, even in very
recent times, local social normative systems
continue to be an important consideration in
understanding corporate behavior.
A number of studies have indicated that local
evaluative criteria and systems are important
for understanding the level of firm giving within
the community. Extending Galaskiewicz’s work
on local tithing clubs, Navarro (1988) found hav-
ing such clubs to be a significant predictor of
firm-level contributions across a sample of 249
large national firms, and McElroy and Siegfried
(1986), on the basis of interviews with corporate
philanthropy personnel in 14 U.S. cities, suggest
that a significant amount of giving is influenced
by other firms within the local community.
The effect of local tithing clubs on the level of
corporate social action might be obvious, but,
more generally, social networks serve an impor-
tant role in promoting conformity to local norms
by providing a context for transmitting and en-
forcing local standards of behavior. The bound-
aries of the “local community” can be extremely
local. Festinger, Schachter, and Back’s (1950) fa-
mous study of MIT student housing describes
how social networks that coalesced around clus-
ters of apartments tended to generate their own
local standards around issues such as whether
there should be a tenant association, leading
the authors to conclude the following:
There are not usually compelling facts which can
unequivocally settle the question of which atti-
tude is wrong and which is right in connection
with social opinions and attitudes as there are in
the case of what might be called “facts”. . . . The
“reality” which settles the question . . . is the de-
gree to which others with whom one is in com-
munication are believed to share these same at-
titudes and opinions, [which] tends to produce
uniformity in the behavior of members (1950: 168–
169).
Thus, when annually revisiting questions such
as “What is the right amount to donate to local
nonprofits?” the “right” answer hinges on the
opinions of peers to whom an actor is socially
connected.
This process has an edge to it: dense social
networks generate many opportunities where
one has to explain oneself to one’s peers for
failing to uphold “community standards.” In his
memoirs, Harold Geneen, who built the con-
glomerate ITT during the 1960s and early 1970s,
argued that peer pressure was the most effec-
tive way to influence corporate directors.
What can spur them to action? One thing: the fear
of looking foolish. Most didn’t join the board to
make money or to prove themselves; they joined
for the prestige. To see that prestige threatened is
their worst nightmare. The dread of humiliation
is their one great motivating force. Thus, if a
board member’s golf partners start making wise-
cracks about the company that he is supposedly
guiding, watch out. He’ll get into fighting trim,
fast (Geneen & Bowers, 1997: 86).
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Executives who face such encounters routinely
in the context of the social organization of the
local elite are likely to be susceptible to norma-
tive pressures on their firms’ social actions.
This prior research suggests the importance of
local network connectedness. Recent empirical
work (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Guthrie, 2003; Os-
trower, 2002) and our discussions with civic
leaders reveal the types of connections and lo-
cal institutions to be important elements of local
social systems. Minneapolis and Silicon Valley
both have dense local corporate networks yet
stand nearly at opposite ends of the spectrum of
corporate social action. Our discussions have
identified two key elements of local social nor-
mative systems that cultivate an environment
that promotes high levels of local corporate so-
cial action. One is dense connections between
local nonprofits and corporations, which encour-
age higher levels of corporate involvement. The
other is the development of a local institutional
infrastructure, particularly two important types
of local institutions—community foundations
and elite civic involvement groups—that, by
connecting corporations to their communities,
play an essential role in promoting high levels
of engagement. Local institutions serve to put
corporations directly in touch with social needs
and channel the capacity for coordinated action
created by dense networks.
Connections between nonprofits and local
corporations tend to promote greater levels of
corporate social involvement; more connections
between corporations and nonprofits facilitate
the spread of information and increase the like-
lihood that companies will give (Galaskiewicz,
1997). Localities clearly see connections be-
tween corporations and nonprofits as important.
In one of the cities where we conducted inter-
views, the local chamber of commerce ran a
nonprofit board member development program
for corporate executives with the explicit goal of
placing executives on nonprofit boards. Many
nonprofit boards, moreover, have standard giv-
ing amounts for board members—the arts mu-
seum in one local community having an implicit
standard of a $10,000 annual gift from all board
members. Ostrower’s (1995) finding of a strong
connection between board memberships and
giving is summarized in the oft-quoted maxim
shared by arts nonprofit board members: “Give,
get, or get off” (Ostrower, 2002: 66). Thus, it would
seem that the greater the density of connections
between nonprofits and corporations, the
greater the level of corporate giving, both be-
cause individual board members will influence
their corporations’ giving and because the
closer connections they have to others will raise
giving levels overall.
The presence of an active institutional infra-
structure, including such entities as community
foundations and elite civic involvement groups,
also fosters corporate social action in local en-
vironments. In our interviews the existence of
local institutions connecting corporations and
nonprofits was seen as essential to generating
corporate social action that benefited the com-
munity. A frequently cited influence on the level
of corporate giving was community founda-
tions—organizations designed explicitly to sup-
port local philanthropic projects. The president
of a local community foundation, who described
the primary role of the organization to be to
connect local corporations to local nonprofits,
explained that the foundation’s board served as
a mechanism for putting executives in touch
with places to donate funds and become in-
volved. Guthrie (2003) reported that 89 percent of
corporations indicated that they received fund-
ing requests from local nonprofits, so institu-
tional mechanisms to connect corporations and
social welfare groups would likely generate
higher levels of funding. The president of the
largest community foundation in one of the cit-
ies where we did our interviews estimated that
80 percent of the allocations by corporate repre-
sentatives on the board were to other board
members’ organizations.
Elite business groups that network the leader-
ship of local corporations serve an important
role as disseminators of information and norms
regarding corporate social action. These exist in
many cities; two of the best-known are Detroit
Renaissance and Cleveland Tomorrow. These
organizations promote high levels of corporate
engagement in two ways. First, they have the
explicit objective of economic development,
which is often carried out with the aid of corpo-
rate donations and other involvement. Second,
the CEOs of the member organizations attend
approximately a dozen meetings per year, fur-
ther orienting them to community social en-
gagement. Detroit Renaissance has funneled
corporate funds from the largest companies in
southeastern Michigan into countless social
programs that have targeted, among other
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needs, housing, economic development, minor-
ity business, cultural arts, and the local public
schools (see www.detroitrenaissance.com), and
Guthrie and McQuarrie (2005) credit Cleveland
Tomorrow with helping to drive the revitaliza-
tion of Cleveland and note that neither Atlanta
nor Seattle has such a group, a structural disad-
vantage for those communities. Although the
importance of these CEO groups has been spe-
cifically acknowledged by Guthrie and McQuar-
rie (2005), as well as by our interviewees, other
elite business groups, such as chambers of com-
merce and local United Way chapters, might
play a similar role.
Building on Galaskiewicz’s groundbreaking
work on the development of local institutions
that fostered giving in Minneapolis, we attempt
to illuminate a more general theory of how local
social systems can foster greater levels of cor-
porate social action. We emphasize two impor-
tant connecting mechanisms that facilitate the
dissemination of information about community
needs and expectations to companies. One is
greater connectivity among corporations and
nonprofits, which, we maintain, will spur
greater levels of corporate involvement. The
other is the existence within communities of an
active institutional infrastructure, particularly
community foundations and elite involvement
groups; we theorize that the greater the pres-
ence of these organizations, the greater the level
of corporate involvement. More formally, we
make the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Community-level social
and normative institutional forces will
affect the level of corporate social ac-
tion. Greater connectivity between
corporations and local nonprofits, as
well as the presence of local institu-
tions, increases the level of corporate
action.
Regulative Community Factors
In Scott’s formulation, “Regulative processes
involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect
or review others’ conformity to them, and, as
necessary, manipulate sanctions—rewards or
punishments—in an attempt to influence future
behavior” (2001: 35). In translating this to the
community level, we focus on how local politics
and government mandates can temper or pro-
mote both the nature and level of corporate so-
cial action.
Regulatory forces are important for under-
standing corporate social action. King and
Lenox (2000), who studied the efficacy of both
self-regulation and governmental sanctions on
environmental action by the chemical industry,
found, for example, that, absent governmental
intervention, there is significant potential for op-
portunism by chemical organizations. Similarly,
in a review of the “green business” literature,
Newton and Harte (1997) highlight the limits of
voluntary action and advocate a stronger role
for regulations in creating organizations that
are committed to organizational change. These
studies suggest that coercive regulations are
important as guides for how and where to focus
corporate social action.
These regulatory effects on organizations
might seem straightforward, but recent work in
organizational sociology complicates the rela-
tionship between laws and organizations, not-
ing how mandates regarding corporate actions
and structures are often highly ambiguous. En-
actment of the civil rights acts of the 1960s, de-
signed to end workplace discrimination, was
not, for example, followed immediately by U.S.
corporations’ adoption of a uniform and consis-
tent set of practices. Edelman (1992), who docu-
mented the varying degrees of compliance with
which firms implemented equal employment
policies and affirmative action offices, observed
that these organizational variations seemed to
be governed by variations in the institutional
environments firms confronted. And, as Hoff-
man’s (1999) work suggests, regulative forces
are, in many ways, only a starting point.
Although the existence of regulation clearly
shapes corporate action, its implementation
within institutional fields accommodates con-
siderable variation. Guthrie and McQuarrie’s
(2005) work on the influence of the Low Income
Tax Credit (see Guthrie, 2004, for a summary of
this law) on housing spending shows how re-
sponses to legislation can vary by community.
As they describe it, corporations’ successful im-
plementation of these acts requires the develop-
ment of a local organizational field to serve as
an intermediary. Guthrie documents how this
field coalesced in Cleveland and, to a lesser
extent, in Atlanta, but not in Seattle, leading to
considerable variation in the success of corpo-
rations’ utilization of Low Income Tax Credits in
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these three cities. The existence of legislation is
thus in some ways only an impetus for action—
the eventual practices that result being deter-
mined more by the dynamics of firms’ institu-
tional environments (Edelman, 1992).
Local governments play an important role in
focusing corporate investment in communities.
Bielefeld and Corbin (1996), for example, studied
how the underlying political culture of metropol-
itan areas influences the types of nonprofits
governments and the private sector will fund.
Guthrie and McQuarrie (2005) credit the success-
ful use of Low Income Housing Credits in Cleve-
land to former Mayor George Voinivich for his
emphasis on public/private partnerships. The
changing relations between Detroit’s city gov-
ernment and the local corporate community over
the past thirty-five years provide a further ex-
ample of how local governments can focus busi-
ness involvement in a community. In the wake of
the Detroit riots in the late 1960s, large compa-
nies abandoned the city in droves. Mayor
Coleman Young’s perceived open hostility to lo-
cal corporations prompted even more business
exits during his tenure (1974 to 1993). The process
of encouraging business involvement in the
community began with Dennis Archer, mayor
from 1994 to 2001, who promised a “180-degree
shift” (Jacoby, 1998: 534). Archer led Detroit’s es-
tablishment of the Empowerment Zone program
(www.detex.com), a new approach to urban re-
vitalization whereby businesses, residents, and
nonprofits come together to revitalize an eco-
nomically depressed area. This program at-
tracted investments in excess of one billion dol-
lars from the Detroit business community and
involved more than ninety economic develop-
ment and human services programs focused on
safety and beautification of the area, as well as
residents’ educational, health, transportation,
and employment needs. These examples sug-
gest that political actors and governmental reg-
ulations vary considerably by state and even
community and that regulative factors influence
where and how corporations engage in social
action. We summarize these observations in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3a: Regulative factors
within communities will affect the na-
ture of corporate social action such
that legal and political concerns will
either temper or promote the focus
and form of corporate social action.
The relationship between tax breaks and
level of corporate social action has received sig-
nificant attention from researchers. Burt (1983)
documented a correspondence between giving
and tax rates, a finding replicated by Bakija and
colleagues (Bakija & Gale, 2003; Bakija, Gale, &
Slemrod, 2003), among others. Governmentally
defined incentives are also important for in-kind
giving. Useem (1987), who described how the
Tax Act of 1981 allowed manufacturers liberal
valuations of goods donated to a range of char-
itable causes, including education, health, and
human services, noted that pharmaceutical and
food companies benefited most from this provi-
sion. Greene and Williams (2002) have docu-
mented similar deductions available to com-
puter firms. This well-established relationship
between tax rates and giving is clearly an im-
portant influence on the level of corporate social
action. We summarize these observations in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3b: Regulative factors
within communities will affect the
level of corporate social engagement
such that the existence of legal and
political incentives will either temper
or promote the level of corporate so-
cial action.
Relating the Nature of Corporate Social Action
to the Level of Corporate Social Action
We have outlined a theoretical framework for
understanding how the institutional infrastruc-
ture of communities affects the nature or level of
corporate social action. We now connect these
two outcomes. We theorize that isomorphism (or
community consensus) on the appropriate forms
and foci of corporate involvement will lead to
higher levels of overall giving as greater num-
bers of corporations engage, often more gener-
ously, in the sanctioned activity.
Prior work supports the existence of this rela-
tionship. Useem (1991), for example, found that
higher overall agreement among local busi-
nesses to support the arts generated greater lev-
els of corporate funding. More generally, corpo-
rate social action benefits from mobilization
around a focal concept, much like collective ac-
tion in a social movement or the diffusion of a
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particular innovation. Because in the early
stages of mobilization processes there is often
considerable uncertainty about the value of an
innovation or a particular action, the earliest
participants tend to engage for idiosyncratic
reasons. But as more organizations adopt a
practice, the character of adopters shifts from
the periphery to the center, to actors whose
adoption helps legitimize the innovation (e.g.,
banks and utilities). The rate of participation
subsequently accelerates, and the innovation
diffuses more rapidly (Rogers, 1995). Thus, insti-
tutionalization of the form or focus of corporate
social action can create a bandwagon effect that
increases the overall level of activity.
Research on the processes of institutionaliza-
tion has demonstrated how greater cognitive
agreement on a practice leads to greater preva-
lence of that practice. Glynn and Abzug (2002)
documented, in a study of organizational names
and name changes, significant differences in
corporate naming patterns in different historical
periods. Moreover, they found that the greater
the presence of particular naming types, the
more likely companies were to adopt names
consistent with the pattern (Glynn & Abzug,
1998). Their findings suggest a snowball effect:
as a form gains legitimacy, more and more com-
panies adopt it, until it eventually emerges as a
dominant practice. Consistent with this argu-
ment, Fligstein (1985) found that mimetic isomor-
phism follows the period of early adoption of
innovations in corporate form, and Davis and
Greve (1997) connected the argument to the com-
munity level by theorizing how corporate gover-
nance practices vary in degree of legitimacy by
geographic area. In all of these cases, corporate
forms and practices begin as more or less idio-
syncratic activities, but with increased preva-
lence social consensus about the legitimacy of
the practices emerges.
Building on this argument, we expect homo-
geneity in the focus and form of corporate social
engagement within communities to yield in-
creased overall levels of corporate social action.
Returning to our illustration from Columbus,
Ohio (see Table 1), we can see how children’s
needs created a thematic focus for corporate
social practices in the civic, educational, and
health domains. Dave Thomas, perhaps for rea-
sons stemming from his own childhood spent in
an orphanage, committed Wendy’s philan-
thropic resources to children’s concerns. His per-
sonal commitment, supported by Wendy’s, of-
fered other Columbus firms a ready-made
institutional template for social action for civic
and public benefit. Other companies in the Co-
lumbus community followed Wendy’s lead but
infused it with their own interests and expertise.
Cardinal Health, for example, focused on chil-
dren’s health through grants and The Limited on
children’s education through volunteer tutoring
programs for kindergartners.
Likewise, in the Cleveland community (see
Table 2), the Eaton organization had begun sup-
porting employee volunteer efforts as early as
1933, sending a signal that employee volunteer
programs were an appropriate form of corporate
social action. The process of institutionalization
of particular forms and foci of corporate social
engagement thus legitimized models that coa-
lesced community activity, promoting the partic-
ipation of more companies and higher levels of
giving.
Our general argument is that community con-
vergence around a particular form or focus of
corporate social action will lead to higher levels
of overall giving, because corporations will be
more likely to enact and support programs that
are consistent with the community norms. Es-
sentially, the cognitive load is lessened for later
adopters, who can emulate the focus and form of
social engagement of their predecessors. In
turn, we expect to see higher levels of corporate
social action. This suggests the following prop-
osition.
Proposition 4: The greater the level of
agreement among local corporations
within a community on the appropri-
ate focus and form of social action, the
greater the overall level of social ac-
tion by local corporations.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
We have advanced a model that explains how
the community in which firms are embedded
affects the nature and level of corporate social
actions. We theorized that corporate social ac-
tion follows from the institutionalized cognitive
templates, social normative systems, and regu-
lative environment of the local geographic com-
munities in which companies are located or
headquartered. More formally, we proposed that
community-level cognitive cultural forces affect
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the nature of corporate social action (Proposition
1) through the development of a cognitive guid-
ance system that legitimizes the foci and form of
social action. We further proposed that commu-
nity-level normative forces affect corporations’
levels of social activity (Proposition 2) and that
regulatory forces influence both the nature
(Proposition 3a) and level of corporate social
action (Proposition 3b). We also proposed that
the greater the consensus on the nature of cor-
porate social action, the greater the overall level
of activity by local corporations in a particular
community (Proposition 4).
Our theoretical model suggests a view of cor-
porate social action as an outgrowth of institu-
tionalization processes at the level of the local
communities in which firms are headquartered.
We believe that our framework contributes to
the literature on institutional theory and on cor-
porations as social change agents.
Implications for Modeling Corporations As
Social Change Agents
Because we have modeled corporate social
action as arising from and responding to local
communities, we redirect attention from the
dominant atomistic perspective to one that is
fundamentally social in nature. Margolis and
Walsh (2003) documented more than 100 studies
that attempted to link an individual firm’s social
stance to its financial outcomes. We have exam-
ined corporate social action not as an indepen-
dent variable but a dependent variable, located
within the institutional and social structure of
the local community. We explicitly recognize
what Granovetter (1985) terms embeddedness—
that is, that corporate practices for social
change are anchored in networks of relations,
both personal and structural, in the communi-
ties to which firms are tied. The content and
structure of ties among businesses, nonprofits,
local governments, and elite civic organizations
all help to orient firms to particular kinds and
levels of social action. We believe that this ori-
entation helps to reconnect “organizations and
social systems” (Stern & Barley, 1996), a topic
that has repeatedly been the subject of calls for
more research (Hinings & Greenwood, 2002).
Such a view opens up the study of corporate
social activities to several alternative perspec-
tives advocated by Margolis and Walsh (2003).
The tension Margolis and Walsh (2003) de-
scribe in the 127 studies they review comes, of
course, from the prevalence of forces opposed to
corporate social action. Economic theorists and
some social commentators see social engage-
ment as a diversion of business resources from
their proper use (Friedman, 1970) to activities
highly unlikely to earn financial returns. The
daily pressures of business, and simple inertia,
militate in favor of pulling back. Corporate so-
cial action is thus an ongoing accomplishment.
The real question is not why don’t businesses do
more for their communities out of enlightened
self-interest, but why would they ever do any-
thing? (See Margolis & Walsh [2003] for a similar
argument.) The answer to the latter question lies
in finding an explanation for the ongoing vi-
brancy of business-civic connections that per-
vades some communities year after year. We
have drawn on Scott’s (2001) institutional per-
spective to provide some theoretical insights as
to why some communities might be more fertile
soil for corporate engagement than others.
More generally, our framework might general-
ize beyond corporate social action as we have
portrayed it. The concept of community isomor-
phism might apply to other forms of corporate
actions, even to those that might be unintended or
socially undesirable. Community pressures that
encourage corporate conformity to cultural cogni-
tive templates and normative guidelines suggest
that corporate social action might benefit some
aspects of the community to the detriment of oth-
ers. Nonprofit scholars have noted potential elite
biases and the use of charitable contributions to
disproportionately benefit the local upper class
(DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990). Corporations with a
fixed contribution budget under pressure to con-
tribute to a city’s arts programs might, for exam-
ple, neglect more pressing human needs, such as
housing or health care. Corporate contributions
guided by locally defined standards of behavior
and norms might flow to some sectors of the com-
munity and not to others. There might be implica-
tions that public policy, at the local level, should
align corporate social action with needed social
concerns; our framework suggests that institu-
tional levers might enable such alignment.
Implications for Institutional Theory
Beyond explaining corporate social action,
our framework extends the reach of institutional
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theory. Although institutionalists have acknowl-
edged that organizational practices are contex-
tualized within institutional environments
(Scott, 2001), most researchers have overlooked
the geographic community as an influential
level of analysis. Institutional theorists’ neglect
of community-level influences is particularly
ironic, given the theory’s underlying premise
that action and choice cannot be understood
outside of the cultural and historical frame-
works in which organizations are located. Early
institutional researchers sought to show how
organizations were heavily influenced by local
sources of power (e.g., Selznick, 1949; Zald, 1970).
The move from an underlying logic of co-
optation to one of social construction has led
neoinstitutional theorists to focus on geography-
independent organizational sectors or fields.
“Environments in this view are more subtle in
their influence,” suggested DiMaggio and Pow-
ell; “rather than being co-opted they penetrate
the organization, creating lenses through which
actors view the world and the very structures of
action, and thoughts” (1991: 13). As institutional
theorists migrated from a power and political to
a more normative and cognitive orientation,
they also abandoned the study of local influ-
ences.
We have attempted, by illuminating how the
cultural, normative, and regulative logics of in-
stitutional theory can abet our understanding of
how communities influence organizations, to
shed light and expand on the handful of previ-
ous studies that have emphasized the impor-
tance of communities (see also Freeman & Au-
dia, 2006). Galaskiewicz (1997), for example,
described how the local giving patterns of Min-
neapolis-St. Paul–based companies continued
to be influenced by network effects, despite the
retirement of most network members, and Sax-
enian (1994) described how the lingering char-
acteristics of two technology communities, Bos-
ton and Silicon Valley, continued to influence
innovation and production within these regions.
And Lounsbury (2007), in a study of differences
between Boston and New York mutual funds,
showed how competing institutional logics can
have geographic bases.
We are hopeful that the framework we have
built on the foundation of these studies will re-
kindle interest in the study of community in in-
stitutional theory. Meyer and Rowan (1977) sug-
gested that social connections among actors, as
are likely to be present in a community, create
an institutionalized context and constitute the
processes through which rationalized myths
arise. Thus, as our theory and illustrations sug-
gest, it is likely that colocation within commu-
nities would engender isomorphism of corporate
social action.
Future Research Directions
Our focus on corporate social change at the
community level reveals how institutional pro-
cesses operate within more immediate organi-
zational fields, a needed perspective in institu-
tional research (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). How
convergence occurs at more micro levels and
how these micro levels aggregate as institution-
alized patterns to more macro levels, such as the
state, region, or nation state, constitute a needed
window on institutionalization across levels of
analysis. That multinational corporations that
produce and sell in dozens of nations around the
globe evidently continue to reflect the traditions
of social engagement of their hometowns sug-
gests an eminently researchable topic: How
does social action change as the scope of firms’
venues and activities expands from local to na-
tional to global? Further, to what extent does
social performance vary across the globe? Sim-
ilar to KLD in the United States, social rating
agencies exist in a number of countries (e.g.,
ARESE in France [Igalens & Gond, 2005]), and so
a cross-national comparison of corporate social
activities is an eminently researchable topic.
Institutional theory might also benefit from
closer scrutiny of corporate social change ef-
forts, which can introduce agency into the pro-
cess of institutionalization and potentially re-
veal how social action at the firm level produces
and reproduces patterns at the community level.
Researchers investigating corporate social per-
formance might take a page from institutional-
ists’ accounts and historically trace one partic-
ular aspect of corporate social action, such as
volunteerism, arts patronage, or civic booster-
ism, through broad and immediate environ-
ments. Alternatively, they might focus on the
level of community, as suggested by our model,
and conduct comparative, cross-community
studies to detect the relative influences of dif-
ferent institutionalized forces, such as the cog-
nitive, normative, and regulative. Publicly
available archival data sources, such as KLD’s
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Socrates database, the Urban Institute’s data
on nonprofits, census information, and Put-
nam’s Bowling Alone and Social Capital Com-
munity Benchmark Survey web sites (www.
bowlingalone.com,www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/
dataacq/scc_bench.html.), would prove useful to
such researchers. It would also be illuminating
to examine how these externally focused social
actions might correlate with internally focused
social behaviors, such as flexible work schedul-
ing or maternity leave.
We have moored our explanation of corporate
social activities at the community level of anal-
ysis, but future researchers could investigate
how the influence of community might be am-
plified or muted by the inclusion of other levels
of analysis. Scholars investigating corporate so-
cial change might, for example, investigate in-
teractive or nested effects of community that
embrace more macro or more micro levels of
analysis. We can speculate that factors at the
organizational level might interact with those at
the community level to produce more or less
active and engaged corporate citizens. Perhaps
organizations such as The Body Shop, Tom’s of
Maine, or Merck, which are routinely lauded for
their social responsibility, might be more active
social change agents in communities that en-
courage such ideals, and even shape the com-
munity norms and beliefs that emerge. Alterna-
tively, the influence of local environments might
be increased or tempered by other geographic
communities in which they are nested. Institu-
tionalized aspects of cities, regions, nation
states, or global arenas may have cognitive,
normative, or regulative features that work in
concert or conflict with each other. Such studies
would begin to offer a more nuanced view of
corporate social action and, with it, the promise
of corporations’ impact as agents of change.
Institutional forces may also interact with
other sources of heterogeneity across communi-
ties. Exploring the institutional dynamics of
community influence under different boundary
conditions, demarcated by industry, socioeco-
nomic, or firm-level characteristics, is one prom-
ising strategy. The idea that there are size and
industry differences in corporate funding pat-
terns is accepted wisdom (Kirchberg, 1995;
Useem, 1988) and consistent with institutional-
ists’ notions of variations in organizational
fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Future investi-
gators might try to tease out how community-
level institutional effects vary, given other so-
cioeconomic and demographic differences
within local populations.
Finally, we note that the model we advance
may have a recursive dimension such that cor-
porate social action is likely to feed back to
affect the institutional character of the commu-
nity. Although lack of attention to dynamism is
frequently noted as a critique of institutional
theory (Hirsch, 1997), we suggest that this might
represent an enticing direction for future re-
search, because although institutionalists have
demonstrated that environmental factors (Ol-
iver, 1991; Scott & Davis, 2007) and institutional
logics drive action (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Cor-
onna, 2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), they have
been negligent in mapping the full cycle of “in-
stitutional building, maintenance, and destruc-
tion” (Haveman & Rao, 1997: 1607). Barley and
Tolbert observe that corporations are “sus-
pended in a web of values, norms, rules, beliefs,
and taken-for-granted assumptions” but also
alert us to the fact that institutional factors “are
at least partially of their own making” (Barley &
Tolbert, 1997: 93), suggesting the dynamism in-
herent in institutional processes.
One research project suggested by a feedback
loop is examining the institutional effects of cit-
ies’ hosting of major sporting or political events.
As noted in the case of Atlanta, cognitive and
normative influences at the local level help ur-
ban centers host public spectacles like the
Olympic Games; it would be interesting to ex-
amine the impact of such major events on the
cities that stage them. Given that such events
tend to be economically lucrative (Barney,
Wenn, & Martyn, 2002), they likely affect the in-
stitutional infrastructure of the community. Fu-
ture researchers might usefully explore this re-
cursive dimension more explicitly.
CONCLUSION
Our focus on geographic communities as the
institutional fields in which patterns of corpo-
rate social action take shape promises to open
up an important new area of research. Our
model highlights the role of the institutional en-
vironment in the emergence of social action by
corporations, theorizing that isomorphic forces
exist within local communities. An institutional
lens suggests an interplay between corpora-
tions and their communities that focuses, forms,
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and directs social change efforts. This perspec-
tive has the potential to enrich theories on cor-
porate social change and to counter economists’
arguments against such corporate activism.
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